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Menno R. Kamminga
Department of International Relations and International Organization, University of Groningen, Groningen,
the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Since the early 2000s, the concept of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (CE)
has become popular among philosophers and sociologists as a
‘post-nationalist’ way to rethink and reform the European Union
(EU) in an age of globalization. Thus, seeking its justiﬁcation in the
European cosmopolitan tradition as an answer to unrestrained
nationalism in Europe, CE should make the EU pursue a vigorously
cosmopolitan understanding of Europe as well as the world. The
present article defends the claim that prevailing, EU-centred CE is
morally ﬂawed for uncritically presupposing the fundamental
acceptability of the EU as a project that actually clashes with
cosmopolitan justice. A threefold argument is developed. First,
morally, cosmopolitanism is to be understood as a particularism-
critical position that emphasizes global distributive justice. Second,
from this moral cosmopolitan perspective, the EU is unjust for
epitomizing ‘enlarged particularism’. Third, views of CE are unduly
conservative for neglecting – neither acknowledging nor refuting –
cosmopolitan justice while taking the EU’s basic defensibility as
self-evident. The conclusion suggests that CE could only be a
utopian, bottom-up view that advocates EU de-integration in
favour of Europe-wide cooperation for a world more just in a
cosmopolitan sense.
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A widespread belief exists that cosmopolitanism, rooted in Europe’s old universalist
moral traditions, has been a key antidote to the excesses of nationalism in modern
European history (Calhoun 2009). Notably European integration is seen as cosmopo-
litanism-inspired for its contribution to peace and prosperity on a continent long torn
by nationalist warfare and French–German conﬂict. In the 1990s, with the rise of
globalization, cosmopolitanism seemed to become a still more important aspect of
European self-understanding. Europe has acquired leadership in theorizing on ‘reﬂexive
modernization’, renewing neo-Kantian moral universalism, developing international
law, advocating democracy and human rights, providing global ﬁnancial aid and
humanitarian assistance, and boosting global climate policy. Cosmopolitanism seems
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now also present in an intellectual assessment of the diversity globalization has brought
to Europe (Calhoun 2009, 638, 642, 645–647, 650; Eriksen 2006, 62). Since the early
2000s, theorists have come to see the European Union (EU) as a ‘post-national’ upbeat
to a cosmopolitan world order or to a European continent more radically open to
diﬀerence (Brown 2014, 671–672; Eriksen 2014, 109; Habermas 2003; Beck and Grande
2007a; Calhoun 2009). Thus, the concept of ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ (CE) has gained
academic popularity as a means to analyse Europe, notably the EU.
Does ‘EU-centred Europe’ (Calhoun 2009, 645) have cosmopolitan potential, as CE
theorists claim? One argument in favour is that the EU, the most promising post-
national organization, is a model for other world regions. Since it accepts the moral
authority of the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and multilateralism, the EU
could be a hopeful path towards global justice (Eriksen 2006, 260–266). Also, although
the current EU is not Kantian-cosmopolitan, considering its inconsistent application of
the freedoms of cosmopolitan right and the laws of hospitality to non-EU citizens and
its outward human rights policies as distorted by dubious economic behaviour, a ‘truly
cosmopolitan EU’ is believed to be possible once ‘these issues are more clearly
addressed within the EU debate’ (Brown 2014, 687).
Yet serious grounds for scepticism also exist. Firstly, a cosmopolitan political com-
munity has never been a European integration priority (Baban 2013, 220). Also,
contemporary cosmopolitans tend to regard Kantian hospitality as ‘a thin requirement
of the responsibility we have towards each other as human beings’ (234). Moreover,
there are the embarrassing consequences of the common agricultural policy: the EU’s
consistently highest item of expenditure by far with high external tariﬀs, high export
subsidies, and internal price support. This policy of food self-suﬃciency has distorted
the world food market, undermined the ability of poor countries to export their own
agricultural products, and seriously contributed to global poverty (Malcolm 1995,
56–58; Blair [2005] 2010, 33–37; Caney 2006, 127–128; Pogge 2010, 206).1 Overall,
the primary EU goal is ‘global peace and security of Europeans in a broad sense’, rather
than ‘global distributive justice’ as a conventional cosmopolitan concept (De Beus and
Mak 2001, 348; Beitz [1979] 1999). Thus, the EU as a regional polity is at least prima
facie incompatible with cosmopolitan justice.
In this article, I aim to engage critically with the CE debate by discussing in more
detail whether CE can be truly cosmopolitan. What I oﬀer is a moral cosmopolitanism-
based analysis of EU-centred CE, that is, a normative analysis that employs cosmopo-
litanism as a perspective on the question of the scope and content of moral obligation.
Arguably, such an inquiry ﬁts with the individualist egalitarianism of the (European)
Enlightenment culture (Beitz 1999, 518, 529). Speciﬁcally, the great inequalities in
resources and wealth that characterize our ecologically limited world suggest a closer
analysis of the friction between the EU – the centre of dominant CE – and global
distributive justice. Thus, an adequate assessment of EU-centred CE accounts calls for
an answer to the question whether this tension is merely prima facie or actually
stronger. To this end, I treat the EU as a project of European uniﬁcation, understanding
it essentially as a historically developed, distinctive politico-economic organization that
1One could add: the European history of exclusion, persecution, misplaced superiority, and dark colonialism (cf. Pasture
2015).
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features core principles to be maintained by a characteristic set of institutions, laws, and
policies.
Yet my adoption of a moral perspective requires further clariﬁcation, as several
scholars involved in CE theorizing have criticized moral cosmopolitanism, its dominance
notwithstanding, for being unduly abstract and individualist (Delanty 2006, 28–29;
Calhoun 2009, 653). I do submit that the conventional view of the at least ordinarily
overriding nature of moral considerations against other (e.g. self-interested, religious,
legal) ones in determining how one should act holds for global as well as domestic
relations (Stroud 1998; Beitz [1979] 1999, especially 4–5, 179). Still, while my approach
assumes the general academic primacy of (moral or political) philosophy, no matter how
abstract or individualist its ﬁndings, it should not rule out the possibility that CE theorists
oﬀer convincing EU-related arguments for relativizing moral cosmopolitanism, since
cosmopolitanism is contested (Miller 2007, 23) and morality not always overruling.
Then again, it could also be the case that CE theorizing itself shows moral shortcomings
in this respect. Either way, the speciﬁc arguments of CE theorists must be addressed, too.
My thesis will be that leading, EU-centred CE is morally ﬂawed for uncritically pre-
supposing the fundamental acceptability of the EU as a project that actually clashes with
cosmopolitan justice. I will oﬀer a threefold argument for this thesis. First, morally,
cosmopolitanism is to be understood as a particularism-critical position that, as a result,
includes an emphasis on global distributive justice. Thus, here I explain what, more exactly,
I take moral cosmopolitanism to mean. Second, from this moral cosmopolitan perspective,
the EU is unjust for epitomizing ‘enlarged particularism’. Thus, turning to the centre of
prevailing CE, I argue that the EU is incompatible with cosmopolitan justice as explained in
the ﬁrst argument. Third, the main social-theoretical and political-theoretical views of CE
are unduly conservative for neglecting – neither acknowledging nor refuting – cosmopo-
litan justice while taking the EU’s basic defensibility as obvious. Thus, I complete my CE
critique by showing that these views display no awareness of the tension between the EU
and cosmopolitan justice, but actually and unconvincingly endorse the former at the
expense of the latter. I will conclude by suggesting that CE could only be an ‘idealistically
utopian’, radically bottom-up view that advocates EU de-integration in favour of Europe-
wide cooperation for a world more just in a cosmopolitan sense. Thus, I propose that CE
should abandon its EU-centredness by becoming a cosmopolitan movement ‘from below’.
Overall, without oﬀering a full independent defence of moral cosmopolitanism, I argue that
cosmopolitans should reject ‘cosmopolitan Europe’ insofar as that is EU-based.
2. Moral cosmopolitanism as cosmopolitan justice
My analysis of CE requires me, ﬁrstly, to clarify moral cosmopolitanism. My ﬁrst argument,
then, is that, morally, we should regard cosmopolitanism as an anti-particularist position to
which, consequently, global distributive justice is essential (cf. Ulaş 2015, 17; Kodelja 2016).2
This is a view motivated, but not justiﬁed, by the existence of global poverty and extreme
inequality.
2Note that I will ignore the claim that cosmopolitan justice might also require intervention to guarantee the civil
liberties and democratic rights of people living under oppressive conditions. This force-reliant requirement is
controversial and should thus not be employed to assess CE.
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A good starting-point for understanding cosmopolitanism, one also accepted by CE
researchers Pichler (2009, 4, 7, 18) and Schlenker (2013, 30–31), is oﬀered by Martha
Nussbaum, who argues that it is the world community that is fundamentally the source
of our moral obligations, such as those of justice, and which, therefore, should be given
our ﬁrst allegiance. This attitude, she explains, should be cultivated by education that, in
teaching us about ourselves and others, denaturalizes borders (Nussbaum 1996).
Nussbaum’s view ﬁnds support in Gerard Delanty’s one that cosmopolitanism includes
global openness, relativization of one’s own identity or culture, recognition of others’
identities or cultures, and ‘formation of a moral consciousness rooted in emotional
responses to global issues, concern with global ethics, putting the non-national interest
before the national interest’ (Delanty 2012, 336–341, quotation 341). Morally, the
suggestion is that cosmopolitanism opposes (relatively) ‘closed’ forms of particularity,
or particularism: since, unlike individual persons, national, non-national or multina-
tional states, or all other forms of sectional human grouping, do not possess funda-
mental value, the scope of moral obligation is basically global. Consequently, a roughly
egalitarian principle of distributive justice, targeted at improvement of the position of
the worst-oﬀ in a single society, should be extended to the whole world (Beitz [1979]
1999, 198–199, 208, 215–216; Pogge 1989, 241–280; Caney 2005; Holtug 2011; Tan
2013, 32–33; Kodelja 2016, 105–107; Ulaş 2015).3 As (non-cosmopolitan) Thomas
Nagel explains cosmopolitanism and its political implications:
the demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in
principle to all our fellow human beings, and the institutions to which standards of justice
can be applied are instruments for the fulﬁllment of that duty (Nagel 2005, 119).
Yet a distinction has been proposed between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ cosmopolitanism –
one directly relevant to the scope of and content of moral obligation (Miller 2007,
23–50; Tan 2013, 33–34). Supposedly, whereas the ‘weak’ version merely requires that
equal concern is shown for all human beings and, as such, is acceptable to theorists who
defend the ‘naturalness’ of priority to compatriots (Rawls 1999; Nagel 2005; Miller 1995,
2007), ‘strong’ cosmopolitanism requires also that all persons receive substantively
equal treatment, so that we are bound to apply globally, for instance, a principle of
(roughly) equal access to resources or wealth, or a principle of equal opportunity
(Miller 2007, 28, 30, 43–44). It is, then, only the ‘strong’ version that holds that ‘as
moral agents, we have an equal responsibility to respond’ to various claims for aid in
cases of bad things (e.g. starvation) happening and that characteristics such as nation-
ality or location ought not to count (28). Thus, the ‘weak–strong’ distinction denies my
earlier claim that the basically global scope of obligation is essential to cosmopolitan-
ism: ‘we are all cosmopolitans now’ (28).
However, I maintain that only the ‘strong’ version is truly ‘moral cosmopolitan’ (cf. Tan
2013, 44). Thus, ﬁrst, it seems natural to think that ‘cosmopolitanism’ means that our ﬁrst
allegiance lies with the world community and we put the global interest before the national
interest (Nussbaum, Delanty). If cosmopolitanism could also be nationally particularist and
3Examples are Charles Beitz’s and Thomas Pogge’s arguments for a globalized Rawlsian diﬀerence principle and Simon
Caney’s suggestion of globalizing four principles: (1) persons have a right to subsistence; (2) persons of diﬀerent
nations should have equal opportunities; (3) persons have the right to equal pay for equal work; (4) beneﬁting
persons matters more the worse oﬀ they are (Beitz [1979] 1999; Pogge 1989; Caney 2005, 122–124).
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drop the global scope of our obligations of justice, as in the ‘weak’ version, the concept
would lose its critical distinctiveness by indeed turning all morally sensitive people who
acknowledge at least some extra-national moral obligations into ‘cosmopolitans’. But a
meaningful cosmopolitanism exceeds ‘a universal humanitarian requirement of minimal
concern’ (Nagel 2005, 125) and, in considering nationality morally arbitrary (Knight 2011,
19–21), will consistently wish a worldwide ‘common system of institutions that could
attempt to realize the same standards of fairness or equal opportunity that one wants for
one’s own society’ (Nagel 2005, 119). Second, prominent political theorists who defend the
non-derivative signiﬁcance of priority to compatriots explicitly distinguish their view from
‘cosmopolitanism’ (Rawls 1999, 82–83, 119–120; Nagel 2005), precisely because they see the
latter as at odds with attaching basic value to special relationships. Third, then, whereas it
makes most sense to regard moral cosmopolitanism as entirely inconsistent with funda-
mental special obligations (Knight 2011; Holtug 2011), ‘weak cosmopolitanism’, which
accepts such obligations, is best understood as in line with ‘internationalism’, or ‘solidar-
ism’: a ‘two-level’moral position between ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘realism’ (Shapcott [1997]
2014; Beitz [1979] 1999; cf. Miller 2007, 20–21). Also, it will be instantly discarded by ‘post-
nationalist’ CE theorists: they do not wish to defend the basic value of priority to compa-
triots, national or European, and want their cosmopolitanism to be more than ‘almost
platitudinous’ (Miller 2007, 27).4
While moral cosmopolitanism must always view boundaries critically, it is not
necessarily ‘cold’ and ‘thin’, opposed to all ‘thick’ and ‘warm’ forms of solidarity or
justice (against Calhoun 2012, 115–118 and Delanty 2006, 43). Consistent with its non-
particularist emphasis on global standards of distributive justice, moral cosmopolitan-
ism does not simply disqualify special obligations to compatriots (Beitz [1979] 1999),
provided that, to use Thomas Pogge’s words, ‘those who are partial in favor of their
own group’ are, ﬁrstly, ‘impartially concerned for preserving the fairness of the larger
social setting’ (Pogge 2010, 23, emphases in original; cf. Nagel 2005, 120; Tan 2013,
36).5 Therefore, to quote Charles Beitz, they should continue to ‘regard the world from
the perspective of one person among many …, and … choose courses of action,
policies, rules, and institutions on grounds that would be acceptable to any agent
who was impartial among the competing interests involved’ (Beitz [1979] 1999, 58, cf.
199–200).
For group partiality to be justiﬁed, then, either one of the following conditions must
be met (Knight 2011, 25–30). First, the ‘condition of instrumentality’ holds that acting
on special obligations is demonstrably the most eﬀective or eﬃcient means for realizing
cosmopolitan justice as much as possible. In fact, various forms of cosmopolitanism
argue that nationally rooted relationships or patriotic loyalties, which demonstrate that
4CE theorists will reject the theories of John Rawls and David Miller for their emphasis on the non-derivative value of
(normatively) closed peoples or nations. From their side, both Rawls and Miller have criticized the EU for being a
threat to nation-level democracy and social justice (Rawls and Van Parijs 2003; Miller 1998). This disagreement
illustrates the irrelevance of ‘weak cosmopolitanism’.
5Yet Pogge’s more recent stance on global justice does not seem distinctively cosmopolitan overall. Criticizing the rich
countries for the unjust political-economic world order they have imposed on the global poor, Pogge focuses on
defending transnational corrective justice based on the ‘negative’ duty not to harm. However, negative duties to stop
harming or to compensate one’s victims can be consistently included in non-cosmopolitan theories, too; interna-
tionalists can also accept that such duties are rather insensitive to variations in community and distance (Pogge 2004,
278–279; cf. Kamminga 2006, 27). Indeed, Pogge bases his position largely on the strategic aim to ‘keep my
argument widely acceptable’, without speaking of ‘cosmopolitanism’ hereby (Pogge 2010, 28–29, quotation 28).
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people can include strangers in their moral purview, are functionally necessary or
motivationally stimulating to achieve cosmopolitan moral goals (see Kymlicka and
Walker 2013). Second, the ‘condition of constraint’ holds that the special obligations
are not followed before cosmopolitan obligations of justice are satisﬁed and thus are
consistent with the requirement of substantively equal treatment worldwide (cf. Tan
2013, 41–43). We should not prioritize helping those compatriots who are (relative to
other compatriots) economically needy, when particular non-compatriots are in far
greater need and without help (Knight 2011, 29).
Thus, moral cosmopolitanism embraces global pluralism and diversity as long as
these do not violate global distributive justice. Insofar as human groups unreasonably
disrupt the limits of justice, they are not worthy of protection. I will, then, accept the
supremacy of cosmopolitan justice, at least until CE theorists appear to present good
reasons for giving it up. In any case, they should be concerned about the EU’s basic
justiﬁability, especially if the prima facie incompatibility of the EU with cosmopolitan
justice is an actual one indeed.
3. Cosmopolitan justice and the European Union
My second argument is that, from the moral cosmopolitan perspective outlined
above, the EU is unjust for embodying ‘enlarged particularism’. Thus, the ‘post-
nationalist’ EU is intrinsically un-cosmopolitan for being no direct contribution to
cosmopolitan justice, but it also violates the two cosmopolitan requirements for
special obligations: those of instrumentality and constraint. The EU may go beyond
nation-states, but moral cosmopolitanism treats such a reform – like anything else,
including cultural openness and diﬀerence, democracy, and economic systems – as
instrument for, or additional to, the satisfaction of the just interests of individuals
globally. From that perspective, the EU fails (cf. Beitz [1979] 1999, 216; Kamminga
2013, 7–9).
To begin with, the scope of moral obligation that inherently characterizes the EU is
primarily particularist. This is constituted by two features without which we could not
speak meaningfully of the EU as a historically developed, distinctive organization:
‘integrative communitarianism’ and ‘admission selectiveness’, as I call these features.
First, regarding integrative communitarianism, a core principle of European integration
is ‘community preference’, which entails a common system of tariﬀ barriers around an
internal, non-global market. An economic market liberalism (even if ‘social’) is central
in the constitution of the single market of the EU. The EU’s primary competence area
involves the establishment of competition rules for the internal market that assumes the
existence of a customs union and thus requires a common external tariﬀ as well as an
active competition policy (Parker and Rosamond 2013, 236–237; European Union 2012,
last-mentioned treaty, article 3). Thus, a large-scale protectionist system has been
created in order to protect the economic interests of European countries better than
the prewar system did (Blair [2005] 2010, 33). Although the EU aims to transcend
national egoisms and sovereignties, it eﬀectively stretches the member states’ particu-
larisms to the boundaries of ‘Europe’ (even if these boundaries are hard to determine)
and continues to include and exclude people. Internally, borders between states have
been eliminated for free movement; externally, the EU has reinforced boundaries.
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Accordingly, since it deepened with Maastricht through monetary and political uniﬁca-
tion and widened to the east, the EU has strengthened its outer borders by more
restrictive immigration policies towards third country nationals. This explains why,
while many people experience Europe as protector of human rights and peace, migrants
from developing (African) countries and conﬂict areas encounter the EU as ‘fortress
Europe’ (Schlenker 2013, 30, 34–35; Baban 2013, 227–231). In sum, European economic
and political integration leads to an increase of scale without making the actual logic of
moral obligation more global: as members of a single community, citizens have obliga-
tions to each other that they do not have to people outside the borders. From a
cosmopolitan perspective, such a limited increase of scale cannot be a direct contribu-
tion to justice, since the logic of integration precludes a focus on including the world’s
worst-oﬀ. And since it is one goal of the EU to promote European ‘domestic justice’,
prioritizing cosmopolitan justice would lead to a neglect of ‘domestic injustices’ if not
also to EU self-sacriﬁce (cf. Ulaş 2015, 4).
Second, regarding admission selectiveness, the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ for EU mem-
bership demand of candidate countries that they have a viable market economy and
feature stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and respect for and protection of minority rights, and also that they are ‘European’
(Blair [2005] 2010, 142; European Union, 2012, ﬁrst-mentioned treaty, article 49).
Even if we followed prominent CE theorists Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande who, as
will become clearer in the next section, understand ‘Europe’ broadly as a European–
American zone of freedom, democracy, and human rights that should welcome
Turkey and Russia (Beck and Grande 2007a, 11, 60), we would still end up with a
select group of (relatively) rich countries as (potential) EU members. At any rate, for
the foreseeable future at least, it is hard to imagine that (Sub-Sahara) Africa will come
to fall under ‘Europe’, let alone could become part of the EU if that is to maintain
(perhaps somewhat more leniently) its membership criteria as expression of its core
values. Surely, the EU upholds a comparatively high aid budget and attention to the
United Nations and human rights outside its borders. But from a cosmopolitan
perspective, it is dubious, particularly within an inegalitarian capitalist world econ-
omy, that rich European countries are directly and strongly solidary with less rich
European countries (the example of Greece comes to mind immediately) and, accord-
ingly, at most to a limited extent solidary with the (much) poorer (African) countries
in the world (Brown 2002, 181–183). Arguably, this selective solidarity is so forceful
because the richer EU member states have a stake in it. Also, dropping the selective-
ness when admitting states would probably create EU instability and harm its own
economic and security interests.
One may think that the EU, with its transnational character and commitment to
human rights and development assistance, could be justiﬁed more indirectly: as an
example for other regions or a contribution to cosmopolitan justice in the long run.
Perhaps the EU can be understood as a ‘regional’, ‘functional’ (Eriksen 2014, 110)
step towards a truly cosmopolitan order. Yet I argue that the EU’s internal special
obligations, or its ‘integrative communitarianism’ and ‘admission selectiveness’,
cannot be justiﬁed conditionally from a moral cosmopolitan perspective. Thus, the
EU is not the most eﬀective or eﬃcient European contribution to cosmopolitan
justice, and it was not created only after European states had already met their
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obligations of cosmopolitan justice. I oﬀer four arguments – which together cover
both the cosmopolitan conditions of instrumentality and constraint – which explain
why a conditionality strategy fails.
First, it would be hard to see the EU – with its multinational, hybrid character – as a
regional link towards a (non-centralized) world order that is adequate in a moral cosmopo-
litan way (cf. Ulaş 2016). Sociologist Amitai Etzioni has defended the serious empirical
necessity and possibility of a multi-layered (eventually democratic) global polity with the
EU as prominent regional building bloc. For Etzioni, such a system would be better able to
tackle the problems of capitalist globalization (such as spread of nuclear weapons, terrorism,
starvation, and environmental degradation) than the current system of nation-states, US
dominance, international organizations, and transnational movements (Etzioni 2004).
However, one problem is that such a world system would probably clash with moral
cosmopolitanism, since its characteristic advantage of many checks and balances would go
at the cost of (enforcing) global distributive justice. In encouraging the development and
strengthening of group loyalties, such a systemwould also restrict the power of global political
bodies to promote justice for individual personsworldwide.Moreover, precisely because of its
complex and overlapping structures, it would face a (relatively) high risk of instability and
violence (Bull [1977] 2002, 246). Furthermore, even if the EU could help to create a
cosmopolitan world order sometime, with such an order as anything but in sight in the
absence of other EU-like regional blocs, it would in the interim remain an enlarged particu-
larist organization that perpetuates a basic distinction between members and non-members.
From a cosmopolitan perspective, this seems too high a price to pay.
Second, subsequently, the claim that the EU is justiﬁed for being an example for other
world regions overlooks that, due to poverty, regional hostility, or failing leadership, other
regions may be unwilling or incapable to unify as European states have done, which means
that the poor elsewhere (not tomention those of the past decades)may have to wait very long,
if not endlessly, before their exposure to unequal treatment will have ended. What we can be
sure of is that European integration has been mutually self-serving; as we shall see in the next
section, CE theorists Beck and Grande acknowledge this. But that the EU could function as a
region-based example, and thus as an instrument, of cosmopolitan justice is throwing a
hostage to fortune in a world of deep cultural and religious diﬀerences, unequal power
relations, and various prospects for world order.
Third, even if ‘the EU is … also a community of people’ and that, therefore, the EU’s
‘cosmopolitan-ness’ is ‘also dependent on the orientations and convictions of the
individuals who make up this entity’ (Schlenker 2013, 26), it would be wishful thinking
to expect that (something like) a post-national ‘EU patriotism’ will help to motivate
people and, subsequently, the EU itself to help achieve cosmopolitan justice. To be sure,
empirical research on CE ﬁnds positive correlations between emotional ‘European’
identiﬁcation and ‘cosmopolitan’ identiﬁcation, and that ‘[e]motionally, a majority of
Europeans are cosmopolitans’ rather than ‘partisans of fortress Europe’ (Schlenker
2013, quotation 48; Pichler 2009; Schlenker and Blatter 2014, 1102, 1106, 1108).
However, that many Europeans appear to ‘feel emotionally attached’ to the whole
world as well as to Europe says little by itself about their actual willingness to be guided
by the potentially demanding implications of their ‘cosmopolitan identity’, particularly
when these conﬂict with their ‘European identity’ or, indeed, ‘their’ EU. Not only does
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the literature concerned not really discuss this core issue,6 but also we should be
sceptical about individuals’ dispositions and especially their possibilities to meet cos-
mopolitan obligations and EU ones simultaneously and reorient the EU (without
ending it) towards cosmopolitanism this way.
Fourth, the very appeal to cosmopolitan instrumentality would be morally inap-
propriate for missing the historical development of European integration as a project of
enlarged particularism (towards the core principle of community preference). Since it
started around 1950, European integration has constantly been justiﬁed to ‘insiders’
(albeit problematically democratically speaking) but not to ‘outsiders’; basically, their
(opinions about their) rights and interests have never been taken into account, let alone
more or less equally. But by regionally integrating this way, European states have been
violating the cosmopolitan demand of global impartiality as deﬁned earlier (Pogge,
Beitz). European states have not, and could not have, based their regional uniﬁcation on
such a demand, neither directly nor indirectly. From a moral cosmopolitan perspective,
the project of European integration, even if post-nationalist, is to be deplored – at least
beyond the point of having achieved basic (postwar) security (cf. Etzioni 2007) – as
primarily, and increasingly, a project of stretched partiality. During the enlargements,
EU member states have consistently been prioritizing admitted Europeans over citizens
from excluded countries. This process of selective solidarity-stretching cannot be
justiﬁed as somehow beneﬁcial to the global poor, but it also violates the cosmopolitan
condition of constraint, namely that citizens and states in Europe may support relatively
rich Europeans only once they have already met their obligations of worldwide justice
(cf. Kamminga 2001, 246–247, 2014, 67). Indeed, from a cosmopolitan viewpoint,
European nation-states have violated the impartiality clause by ever more integrating
for mutual beneﬁt (stretched partiality) without ﬁrst (or at least simultaneously) ful-
ﬁlling their obligations of justice, particularly by safeguarding just global rules of
competition (as requirement for permissible partiality) in a context of widespread
poverty and inequality between the EU and many parts of the rest of the world. Seen
as such, EU member states have been practicing discrimination by widely, and char-
acteristically, opening their borders for each other’s citizens only, at least without
recompensing others, particularly those who suﬀer from global injustice, for not
being granted membership.7 Arguably, EU protectionism has even damaged global
competitive fairness.8
In sum, to try to justify the EU as consistent with cosmopolitan justice cannot
succeed, with the conditionality strategy smacking too much of opportunism. If any-
thing, the EU is a step backwards due to its extended particularist nature. To facilitate
6This remarkable silence about cosmopolitan moral obligations and justice can also be discerned in political-
philosophical analyses. Thus, Kwame Anthony Appiah defends a ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ that, in rejecting cultural
nationalism and defending attachment to common, basic human rights-respecting institutions, could be compatible
with the EU as well as with states. But he does so by treating cosmopolitanism (like patriotism) merely as a
‘sentiment’, without addressing action-guiding moral implications (Appiah 1998). That, more generally, Appiah’s
‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ lacks moral bite is forcefully argued in Adelman (2013, 187–188, 198–199).
7Cosmopolitan justice does not necessarily require fully open borders. As with global redistribution – which seems
appropriate in case of poverty-driven migrants and other poor people – it can regard open borders as instrumental
and interchangeable (cf. Bauböck 2009, 4–5, 27–28).
8Remarkably, the moral cosmopolitan, Pogge, and a non-cosmopolitan internationalist such as Rawls would all three be
critical of the common agricultural policy’s outward eﬀects and the highly European interest-driven imposition of
intellectual property rights on developing countries (cf. Pogge 2010, 20–21, 23, 35, 206; Rawls 1999, 42–43, 115).
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cosmopolitan justice, we should ‘transcend’, rather than ‘reform’, the sovereign states
system, for cosmopolitan principles would require an entirely diﬀerent global polity: a
world state or federation. While a global ‘avant-garde’ of non-governmental organiza-
tions, pressure groups, trade unions, religious groups, and local social movements
seems necessary (albeit insuﬃcient) for trying to transform egoistic nation-states into
‘cosmopolitan states’, the EU cannot join such activists due to its typical, non-
transformative but re-interpretive, contribution to the maintenance of nation-states
(cf. Ulaş 2015; Kamminga 2006). A moral justiﬁcation for the EU, if it exists, cannot
be grounded in cosmopolitan justice. I now confront the EU-centred CE literature with
this outcome.
4. Cosmopolitan justice and EU-centred ‘cosmopolitan Europe’
Main views of CE, as developed in various degrees of detail in often frequently cited
works, can be classiﬁed as social-theoretical or political-theoretical. As I explain below
without pretending all-inclusiveness, (three) social-theoretical views understand EU-
centred Europe in terms of self-reﬂexive openness to diﬀerence, and (three) political-
theoretical perspectives stress the EU’s potential to help realize universal moral ideals.
My third argument is that these various CE positions are unduly conservative: they all
neglect cosmopolitan justice, without trying to either acknowledge or disprove it, and
while treating the EU’s basic justiﬁability as self-evident. The views show little aware-
ness of the EU’s incompatibility with cosmopolitan justice. Although post-nationalist,
they appear morally uncritical about EU particularism.9
While aﬃrming the EU yet somehow aiming to go beyond it, social-theoretical CE views
give the impression that ‘global justice’ is too abstract to warrant serious consideration. First,
observing that European integration as it has emerged is in crisis, Beck and Grande (2007a,
2007b) propose CE as a political vision and concept for further political integration.
Migration, transnational ﬂows, and cultural diversiﬁcation disqualify frameworks of national
homogeneity and call for a cosmopolitanism that decentralizes the role of states in Europe.
‘Cosmopolitanism’, then, is the proper way to understand ‘Europe’: it helps social science to
abandon its ‘methodological nationalism’ for a ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ that will
make ‘seeing’ Europe possible (Beck and Grande 2007a, 18). While the EU is the institutional
heart of their CE (cf. also VanGerven andOssewaarde 2012; Baban 2013, 221–223), Beck and
Grande stress that ‘“Europe” reaches as far west as Los Angeles and Vancouver and as far east
as Vladivostok – and it included Turkey from the beginning, needless to say’ (Beck and
Grande 2007a, 11). Europe embodies a transatlantic synthesis of (hegemonic) America and
Europe as a sphere of freedom, human rights, and democracy (25–26).
Rejecting cosmopolitan pursuits of universality that eliminate diﬀerence, Beck andGrande
defend a plurality-governed cosmopolitanism: ‘diversity is not the problem but the solution’
(Beck and Grande 2007a, 242, 2007b, 73). Thus, ‘[c]osmopolitanism combines appreciation
for diﬀerence and alterity with attempts to conceive of new democratic forms of political rule
beyond the nation-state’ and ‘aﬃrms… perceiving others as diﬀerent and at the same time as
9To avoid misunderstanding, I do not aim to completely dismiss all these views. Still, my goal is to demonstrate that,
notwithstanding their complexities and diﬀerences, as purportedly ‘cosmopolitan’ perspectives on Europe they all
suﬀer from a similar moral defect, related to exactly how EU-centred they each are.
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equal’ (Beck and Grande 2007a, 12, 13, emphasis in original). CE, then, is ‘a Europe of
diﬀerence’, although regulated by ‘the universal validity of norms and rights’ (14, 15, emphasis
in original). Also, CE ‘cannot simply abolish national Europe but must cosmopolitanize it
from within [and so is] a nationally rooted cosmopolitanism’ (16, cf. 82). Now ‘the European
process of integration involved a cosmopolitanmomentum from the beginning [in transcend-
ing] the nation and [transforming] national sovereignty’ (19, emphasis in original). Still, the
EU is not cosmopolitan enough, because its top-down, uniform policy approach suggests that
it opposes diﬀerence and cultural distinctiveness. CE, then, will create a less institutionalist-
bureaucratic, more diﬀerence-sensitive integration and enrich the EU with multiple, nation-
transcending governance levels (62–72). For Beck andGrande, CE is a bottom-up vision to be
realized by ‘the citizens of Europe’ and civil society movements rather than the EU member
states and governments (Beck and Grande 2007b, 81).
Beck and Grande insist that their proposal is realistic:
Why should the nation-states accept European cosmopolitanism [and] renounce a sub-
stantial portion of their power and sovereignty? Our response … is the theory of cosmo-
politan realism … [I]n the past, the member states of the EC/EU … acted on purely
realistic motives (in the sense of realism in international relations theory), [knowing] that
they can only … realize their [own] interests … by recognizing the legitimate interests of
others and integrating them into their own rational calculations. In this way, it was
possible to achieve both national and European goals … [CE] assumes that this will
remain the case in the future (Beck and Grande 2007a, 20–21, emphasis in original,
cf. 39, 78, 82, 144–145, 219).
However,morally, we encounter an unsatisfactorily defendedCE vision, despite its broadly
post-national emphasis on diﬀerence, pluralism, transnationalism, crisscrossing loyalties,
universal values, transcendence of national egoisms, and civil responsibility. Firstly, Beck
and Grande fail to scrutinize the regular cosmopolitan stress on worldwide justice (albeit see
Beck and Grande 2007a, 159–160). While this seems related to their (counter-intuitive)
insistence on ‘formulating… cosmopolitanism in such away that it is not tied to the “cosmos”
or the “globe”’ (Beck andGrande 2007b, 67), it lacks argumentation. Secondly, their insistence
that CE is consistent with realist theory turns their cosmopolitanism into a fortunate by-
product of realism, at the expense of its critical force. If indeed the EU is realist this way (and
European integration mutually self-serving), it would surely lack the capacity to help realize
cosmopolitan justice, as I argued earlier. Thirdly, the ‘cosmopolitan-ness’ of Beck and
Grande’s CE is further compromised by their treatment of it as a ‘solution’ to an EU ‘crisis’.
In so doing, and notwithstanding their (controversial) extension of Europe beyond the EU to
include North America, Russia, and Turkey, they accept the basic moral value of the EU as
obviously beyond cosmopolitan critique. Fourthly, although the authors underline the cos-
mopolitan agency of citizens within CE, they overlook that European citizens could have
diﬀerent – more straightforwardly global – moral obligations than trying to realize CE by
‘cosmopolitanizing’ the EU. In short, Beck and Grande’s CE is morally underdeveloped
regarding both cosmopolitanism and the EU. Indeed, their CE suggests a relatively soft
‘methodological realism’ rather than ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’.10
10Remarkably, Beck and Grande hold that CE is concerned with Turkey’s EU membership and the Soviet successor states
to protect its security and economic self-interests (‘the principle of proximity’), and that in accentuating environ-
mental, economic, and terrorist threats it acts ‘egoistically’ (Beck and Grande 2007a, 257, cf. 65).
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Second, Delanty proposes to see cosmopolitanism as ‘a cultural medium of societal
transformation that is based on the principle of world openness [with] moments of
world openness created out of the encounter of the local with the global’ (Delanty 2006,
27, cf. 42–43). He observes a globalization-induced process of ‘Europeanization’, of
which ‘the cultural signiﬁcance … lies in a certain cosmopolitanism’ characterized by ‘a
pervasive and ongoing cross-fertilization of identities and discourses to which can be
related a new imaginary … in which the very idea of Europe itself becomes a reality’
(Delanty 2005, 406). As ‘not an exclusively … EU-led project’, cosmopolitan
‘Europeanization entails [that] horizontal links exist between European societies, ver-
tical between European societies and EU, and transversal between European societies
and the global, as well as between the EU and the global’ (Delanty 2005, 407, 2006, 41).
Delanty defends his CE against ‘“national Europe”, that is, a Europe of nations’ and
‘“global Europe” where [a] EU-led Europe plays a major role in the world’ (Delanty
2005, 406). CE captures better how Europeanization is ‘a mediated and emergent reality
of the national and the global’ driven by ‘a dynamic of self-transformation’ (406). CE
embodies a post-national self-understanding that expresses itself within as well as
beyond national identities (411–418).
However, regardless of its analytical potential, Delanty’s CE view is inattentive to cosmo-
politan justice and tacitly accepts themoral standing of the EU as playing an important, even if
not exclusive, role in Europeanization. Since he highlights the impact of globalization, it is
especially unfortunate that Delanty focuses on plurality, interconnectedness, openness, and
self-transformation without examining, let alone incorporating, justice-related issues such as
global poverty and inequality (Delanty 2005, 2006). Although, as noted earlier, he has
broadened his own cosmopolitanism into a more ethical direction, Delanty gives the moral
cosmopolitan insuﬃcient reason for coming to endorse his CE.
Third, Owen Parker oﬀers a ‘critical-constructivist’ CE for assessing the EU (Parker
2009, quotation 1089). Rather than ‘cosmopolitanism’ he defends a ‘cosmopolitan
outlook’ rooted in the idea that ‘the scope of ethical concern should not be limited
by parochial boundaries’ (1088, cf. 1090). Its universality, Parker stresses, depends on
the preservation of diversity, albeit a conditional one. A cosmopolitan outlook is critical
of both universalizing practices and methodological nationalism, but is also self-critical
in order to avoid reintroducing nationalism itself. Parker, then, criticizes the EU for its
‘essentialist view of identity’ (1085) towards a Turkish candidature. Yet he localizes
cosmopolitan ‘footholds’ in the main EU institutional discourses, such as its motto of
unity in diversity and its transnational self-deﬁnition in terms of a set of foundational
principles that privilege human rights, democracy and the rule of law; this oﬀers hope
that CE will eventually come to include ‘cosmopolitan Turkey’ (1087–1099, quotations
1089, 1092). Therefore, CE does not ‘refer to an ideal which a European “we” might
achieve if only we adhered to a particular set of reasonable normative principles, such as
human rights or some theoretical conception of justice’ (1087–1088). That would be to
restore cosmopolitanism: an essentialism Parker wants to avoid (1088).
Unfortunately, Parker’s CE view, although post-national in its defence of a non-
parochial scope of moral concern, suﬀers morally from an unduly quick dismissal of
cosmopolitan justice. His basic mistake is to employ CE in order to reﬂect on (some-
thing like) the ‘EU–Turkey question’, which cannot but result in a rather limited
‘cosmopolitan’ view that, no matter how self-critical and critical of the present EU,
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rules out beforehand the possibility of fundamental EU critique. The moral implications
of excluding an actually demanding ideal such as cosmopolitan justice out of anti-
essentialism are serious: preservation of diversity and consideration of Turkish EU
membership are simply valued higher than, say, (European) attention for the equal
treatment of Sub-Sahara Africans. Indeed, in treating ‘essentialisms’ (nationalist,
European, cosmopolitan) alike (Parker 2009, 1099), Parker suggests that cosmopolitan
justice is as questionable as nationalism, which seems implausible from any reasonable
cosmopolitan perspective. Thus, his replacement of ‘cosmopolitanism’ by a ‘cosmopo-
litan outlook’ is dubious and even misleading: for the EU to cherish diversity and be
open to Turkish (and perhaps Moroccan11) membership does not require it to become
truly ‘cosmopolitan’ rather than merely moderately particularist.12
Political-theoretical views of CE consider universal ideals for the EU to pursue, yet
fail to scrutinize the EU–cosmopolitan justice relationship. First, Jürgen Habermas, who
sees serious EU potential for realizing CE, claims that ‘cosmopolitans’ – unlike
‘Eurosceptics’, ‘market Europeans’, and even ‘Eurofederalists’ – ‘see a federal
European state as a point of departure for the development of a transnational network
of regimes that together could pursue a world domestic policy’ (Habermas 2003,
quotation 96). Next, he argues:
Given its expanded economic basis, a European Federal Republic would … aim at …
advantages in global competition. But if the federalist project only pursues the goal of
bringing a new global player of the magnitude of the United States onto the ﬁeld, it will
remain particularistic and only add a further, economic dimension to the ‘Fortress Europe’
attitude now evident in asylum policies (98).
This, Habermas realizes, raises the question of how the EU could overcome its
particularism, thus whether ‘the small set of globally inﬂuential political actors can
construct a reformed world organization from a loosely connected network of transna-
tional regimes’ so that ‘a change of course, toward a global domestic policy without a
global state, is possible’ (98–99). What Habermas proposes is a more uniﬁed yet open
world polity, of which ‘[t]he long-term goal [is] the steady overcoming of social division
and stratiﬁcation within a global society, but without damaging cultural distinctive-
ness’ (99).
However, although Habermas’s global outlook and his concern about the possibility
for the EU to remain particularistic match with moral cosmopolitanism, his CE vision
is inadequately defended. Firstly, Habermas does not discuss, favourably or critically,
global distributive justice as central to moral cosmopolitanism (Habermas 2003).13
Presumably, this is because, actually, ‘he is not … a thoroughgoing cosmopolitan’
11Cf. Parker (2009, 1094). In 1987, Morocco was denied membership for not being a ‘European’ country.
12This problem also plagues the EU-critical anti-CE view of Baban (2013). Using a ‘cosmopolitanism’ that celebrates
diﬀerence and plurality but omits (distributive) justice, Baban portrays ‘Europe’ as ‘eclectic culture’ in which ‘Turkey’s
membership of the EU or Muslims’ presence in Europe or claims of recognition by other cultural minorities’ are
fearlessly ‘welcome[d] as part of the remaking of European culture’ (234). However, even a particularist EU – albeit
only within the limits of freedom, human rights, and democracy – could honour Baban’s call for (cultural and
religious) openness, without contributing to cosmopolitan justice for the world’s poor. Remarkably, Baban stresses
(the debate about) Turkey’s EU membership heavily (and uncritically) (221, 224–226, 230–231, 234–235), while, from
a cosmopolitan perspective, Sub-Saharan Africa seems the ‘other’ most entitled to European (redistributive)
‘openness’.
13Elsewhere, Habermas proposes a ‘universalistic … morality of equal respect and solidaristic responsibility for every-
one’, but without linking it to the EU or to CE (Habermas 1998, 28).
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(Sangiovanni 2012, 397). Secondly, the strong eﬀort Habermas’s ‘reformed’ global polity
should put in maintaining cultural distinctiveness may well go at the expense of
(distributive) justice in the global society. Thirdly, his critique of a particularistic EU
notwithstanding, Habermas too simply assumes that the EU possesses the capacity to
overcome particularism to such an extent that it will become consistent with cosmo-
politan standards. Indeed, it is due to his neglect of cosmopolitan justice that he can
take the basic cosmopolitan-ness of the EU for granted.
Second, IanManners foresees aCE through the EU’s ‘cosmopolitical’ potential to ‘combine
communitarianism with cosmopolitanism’ (Manners 2008, quotations 47, 2013). Thus, the
‘EU principle of the rule of law’ – which includes building trans-European partnerships and
promoting multilateral solutions to shared problems – has a cosmopolitan dimension: it
‘advances the development and participation of the EUand itsmember states in humanitarian
law and rights applicable to individuals’ (51). Manners regards the EU as a ‘normative power
towards the achievement of a more just, cosmopolitical world which empowers people in the
actual conditions of their lives’ if this vision will be ‘based onmore universally accepted values
and principles that can be explained to both Europeans and non-Europeans alike’ (60). The
EU’s cosmopolitanism should be more ‘critical’ than ‘liberal’: deliberative, gender, and
diﬀerence politics should replace ‘proximity to neo-liberal globalization’ (480–481).
However, as an EU enthusiast who speaks of ‘[t]he normative ethics of the European
Union’ (Manners 2008, article title, emphasis added), Manners fails to be clear about, or
critically examine, cosmopolitan justice and its troubling relationship with the EU. In
suggesting that cosmopolitan justice is unduly close to neo-liberalism, he fails to
acknowledge that moral cosmopolitans generally treat globalization merely as an
important situation in which obligations of justice acquire special force. Manners,
then, accepts too easily that, basically, cosmopolitanism cannot be problematic for the
communitarian EU to uphold. Thus, his CE, while global, is uncritically thin as a
cosmopolitan view.
Third, CE theorist Espen Olsen starts from the belief that democracy beyond the
nation-state will become a future possibility (Olsen 2014). Linked to the EU, the
cosmopolitan idea entails ‘the promise of a non-state entity based on cosmopolitan
principles, universal human rights, and rule of law’, that is, ‘a regional subset of a
cosmopolitan global order’ (345). Required, then, is the ‘de-linking of democratic
decision-making and individual rights’ from the nation-state’s ‘institutional “grip”’
(346, 355). This does not entail the disappearance of governmental institutions, Olsen
stresses, since ‘some hierarchical attributes are necessary to enforce compliance with
cosmopolitan norms’ (346). Thus, the institutional goal is a ‘pyramidal … structure’ of
three levels: global, European, and EU member states (346). Herewith, cosmopolitanism
oﬀers a democratic system in which citizenship rights can ﬂourish without the typically
modern ‘trinity’ of nation, state, and territory, and in which democratic legitimacy is
grounded in ‘adherence to universal rights and higher-order laws’ (346). Citizenship,
then, is ‘genuinely post-national in the cosmopolitan conception of the EU’, since
‘rights are inherently individual and universal’ rather than restricted by nation-state
membership (346, emphasis omitted).
However, while treating cosmopolitanism as basically a moral position, Olsen is
silent about the global scope of obligations of cosmopolitan justice and the incompat-
ibility of the EU with such obligations. Thus, Olsen overlooks that a defence of the EU
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as a non-national, post-national or transnational entity, even if a democratic one rooted
in individual and universal human rights, does not suﬃce to show that such a regional
subset of a global polity will be acceptable from a moral cosmopolitan perspective.
Again, the EU is seen from the outset as beyond basic critique.
In sum, the CE views discussed fail morally as ‘cosmopolitan’ ones. With their easy EU
approval, they deprive cosmopolitanism of its critical moral edge, so that they can see a basic
ﬁt between cosmopolitanism and the EU. Considering this CE apathy to cosmopolitan justice,
cosmopolitans should not now abandon their moral ideal for EU-centredness. The earlier
established incompatibility of CE’s EU core with cosmopolitan justice retains full force.
5. Conclusion
Morally, EU-centred CE displays a lack of cosmopolitan capacity. Thus, unwilling to
question the justiﬁability of the EU, prevailing CE views fail for assuming without
serious examination that cosmopolitanism means little more than post-nationalism or
self-reﬂexive pluralism – as if it is not also, or even primarily, a radical view of global
justice. From a moral cosmopolitan perspective, the EU – understood dynamically as a
historical project of European uniﬁcation – does not carry potential for further devel-
opment towards cosmopolitan justice but rather entails a worsening of the particularist
problem in Europe. Moreover, if moral cosmopolitanism is correct, or superior to
internationalism and realism, the academic study of European integration as worth-
while in its own right would lack moral justiﬁcation. If, conversely, the EU were right
and moral cosmopolitanism wrong – a possibility this article must leave open – a
morally friendlier form of ‘methodological realism’ would seem a better way to study
the EU than methodological cosmopolitanism (cf. Hyde-Price 2008; Shapcott [1997]
2014, 202), and the very CE idea would make no moral sense whatsoever.
Perhaps the argument for EU-centred CE could be morally rescued, or repaired, by
still establishing the cosmopolitan superiority of the EU over justice, or by surprisingly
refuting my argument of EU–cosmopolitan justice incompatibility, but the prospects do
not look good. Meanwhile, if CE should have a future as a morally coherent concept, it
seems most plausible to reinterpret it as a radically bottom-up view that advocates EU
de-integration in favour of Europe-wide cooperation for a world more just in a
cosmopolitan sense. Let me explain this brieﬂy. A truly cosmopolitan Europe straight-
forwardly relativizes outside boundaries as well as inside ones. Revitalizing Europe’s
cosmopolitan intellectual traditions and the view that, ultimately, individual human
beings are the possessors of moral rights and obligations, citizens and their movements
(Beck and Grande’s agents, but aware of their primarily global obligations) should take
the lead by creating a European ‘avant-garde’, countering the leadership that has led to
the EU as self-serving, enlarged particularism, and paving the way towards cosmopo-
litan justice. CE should be a cosmopolitanism from below that ensures that Europe both
does not relapse into continent-wide nationalism and, perhaps by keeping moderate
national loyalties, moves forward by contributing to a more just world. Thus recon-
structed, CE is highly demanding and far less realistic than Beck and Grande’s proposal.
It would be an ‘idealistic utopia’ for being beyond the scope of institutional politics.14
14Compare Rawls’s political-philosophical defence of his Law of Peoples as a ‘realistic utopia’ (Rawls 1999).
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But criticism, not realism, is the essence of cosmopolitanism. Ultimately, CE could
represent the moral price-tag attached to the contemporary European order.
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